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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
successful. The need lies in the lack of clarity surrounding the con-
ditions suggested by the letter and spirit of the air-brake provisions.
This corrected, the medial difficulties of judicial construction would
be eliminated.' But the solution can only be supplied by the Congress
or the ICC.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE SPEECH-ORDINANCE PROHIBIT-
ING DISTRIBUTION OF ANONYMOUS HANDBILLS HELD UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL.-Defendant was convicted of violating a Los Angeles
ordinance prohibiting distribution of anonymous handbills.' On
certiorari the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was an uncon-
stitutional restraint on free speech. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
(1960).
By virtue of the first and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution all persons are guaranteed the freedoms of speech
and of the press.2 It is also well settled that municipal ordinances
adopted under state authority constitute state action and are also
restricted.8 While the prohibitions of the Constitution are primarily
designed to prevent previous restraints on publication, 4 official re-
prisal against a person for having exercised the protected rights is
also forbidden.5 Nor is freedom of expression limited to the right
of publication; the Constitution is also violated by restrictions placed
upon circulation. 6
I Los ANGELES, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06: "No person shall distribute
any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have
printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address of the
following:
"(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
"(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, how-
ever, that in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious
name, the true names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the
person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear thereon." Cited in Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60-61 (1960).
2 The first amendment expressly restricts the federal government, and the
fourteenth amendment has been held to restrict the states from unreasonable
infringement of these rights. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707
(1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3 Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. City of Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916).
4 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5 "[T]he mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered
orally there can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might
be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword, if,
while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public au-
thorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications." 2 COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed. 1927).
6 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
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Freedom of speech does not imply a right to say anything at
any time regardless of the consequences. 7 Certain classes of ex-
pression, notably the lewd, the profane and the libelous, are outside
the protected area of free speech. 8 Even within the legitimate scope
of free expression, a restriction may be permissible if necessitated by
a compelling public interest.9
The point at which the exercise of free speech becomes subject
to governmental limitation is not easily located. The "clear and
present danger" test, first formulated by the Supreme Court in
Schenck v. United States,'° has been imposed as a general guide in
determining the constitutionality of a law which purports to restrain
the free exercise of the right of expression. The test formulated is
that the exercise of the right will be susceptible to restraint only when
the gravity of the evil to be averted, discounted by the improbability
of its occurrence, justifies it." Implied in the test is the further
qualification that, though the public interest be substantial, the statute
designed to safeguard that interest should not be so broad as to un-
necessarily restrict speech which is not within the objectionable
class.12
The right to remain anonymous has twice previously been di-
rectly considered by the Supreme Court and both times it was in
reference to freedom of privacy in group associations. In New York
ex rel. Bryant v. Zimnerman,'3 a statute 14 which required registra-
tion and disclosure of the names of all members of organizations re-
quiring an oath as a prerequisite for membership was upheld. In
requiring that the Ku Klux Klan submit membership lists, the Court
held that, in view of the violent and unlawful activity of the Klan,
the legislature had acted properly. In NAACP v. Alabanzq,'5 a
court order to produce membership lists was held to be in violation
of the fourteenth amendment where the state could not show a jus-
tification for the deterrent effect which disclosure would be likely to
have on lawful private activity. The Court recognized the deterrent
effect which the interplay of governmental and private action may
have on the exercise of the right of association.' 6 The distinction
between the two cases is not based upon any difference in the result
which disclosure had upon the two organizations, but upon the fact
that government action having a deterrent effect on a lawful right
will nevertheless be upheld if there is demonstrated a public interest
7 See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918).
8 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
9 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
10 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3' See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
12 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (by implication).
13 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
'4 N.Y. Cm. RIGHTs LAW § 53.
1 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
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sufficient to justify this effect.' 7  In both cases the disclosure would
have a deterrent effect on the members' exercise of their right of free
association, but in the Bryant case, the Court found in the activities
of the organization a danger of a substantive evil which the state
could lawfully act to avert, while in the NAACP case, such a danger
was not present.' 8
Statutes restricting the right to remain anonymous are not un-
common. Examples of such restrictions may be found in state 19 and
federal 20 regulations of distribution of election campaign materials,
and in federal statutes requiring the labeling of mail and identifica-
tion of broadcasts of Communist organizations. 21 The Federal
Lobbying Act,22 compelling the disclosure of all persons employed
for the purpose of influencing congressional legislation, has been sus-
tained as a valid method of securing a vital national interest 8 A
statute requiring newspapers to furnish the names and addresses of
officers and owners in order to secure second class mailing privileges 24
has been upheld.25 It will be noted that the legislation in each of
these cases is motivated by a substantial governmental interest which
was to be protected, and further, that each has application only to
expression of the class which was deemed a threat to that interest.
The purpose of the Los Angeles ordinance was to provide an
individual, defamed by such literature, with a modicum of informa-
tion about its origin and to insure the effective operation of the penal
sanctions provided for abusing the constitutionally guaranteed rights.2 6
To accomplish this, the distribution of handbills was prohibited unless
they bore the name and address of the originator and the distributor.
The ordinance imposes no other restrictions upon the content of such
literature.2 7 It is not violated even though the writing is libelous or
obscene, provided the author and distributor acknowledge their re-
sponsibility therein. Conversely, where the handbill does not contain
17 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400
(1950).
is See People v. Talley, 332 P.2d 447, 452 (Cal. App. Dep't 1958) (concur-
ring opinion) : "The distinction . . . between the two [cases] seems to be that
the members of N.A.A.C.P. are good guys and the members of Ku Klux Klan
are wicked men."
1 See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 781(b). The constitutionality of state elec-
tion laws has been upheld by several state courts. State v. Freeman, 143 Kan.
315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936); State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525
(1922); Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A2d 137 (1944).
2062 Stat. 724 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1959).
2164 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1959). The act was held valid in
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rezld on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
2260 Stat. 839-42 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1959).
23 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
2437 Stat. 553 (1912), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 233 (1959).
25Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
26 People v. Arnold, 127 Cal. App.2d 844, 273 P.2d 711, 713 (1954).
27 Ibid.
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the names and addresses of those responsible for it the ordinance
is violated even though the subject matter is within the area of pro-
tected speech and otherwise immune from censure. The ordinance
was not limited to unlawful handbills, but applied to "any handbill
in any place under any circumstances." 2S Therein lies the consti-
tutional objection. In order to accomplish its purpose of deterring
and aiding in the punishment of abuses of the right freely to com-
municate by handbills, the ordinance imposed a restraint upon all
occasions where it was desired to use them. The evil sought to be
averted simply did not justify the measure adopted to avert it.29
It cannot be seriously doubted that such an ordinance would
deter at least some writers and distributors. Anonymity clothes not
only the lawbreaker, but also the spokesman of the unpopular view-
point who fears the censure of business and social contacts, as well
as the writer who simply wishes to avoid the public eye. The right
of free expression cannot be said to be limited only to those who are
so courageous or so deeply moved that they will act regardless of
the consequences which might follow. The purpose of the ordinance
could have been equally well served by providing additional penalties
for literature of the offensive class if the author and distributor were
not named therein. It is submitted, therefore, that the Court acted
wisely in striking down an ordinance which encroached upon a
fundamental freedom without any showing of real necessity for
doing so.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORATION
SUBJECTED TO SUIT ON BASIS OF SINGLE CONTRACT NOT VIOLATION
OF DUE PROcEss.-Defendant, a foreign corporation engaged in the
manufacture of house trailers, was sued on the theory of implied
warranty on the basis of a single sale by a resident dealer. The de-
fendant had granted the dealer an exclusive franchise, joined in filing
documents for the dealer's license, reimbursed such dealer for one-half
of advertising costs, drafted the dealer's conditional sales contracts,
sent a warranty policy directly to the resident purchaser, furnished
servicemen in an attempt to repair defects, and maintained corres-
pondence with the dealer concerning the unsuitability of plaintiff's
trailer. Service of process was made on the Secretary of State and
notice to defendant was accomplished by ordinary mail pursuant to
28 Los ANGELES, CAL., MuNicIPAL CODE § 28.06.
29 "Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public con-
venience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to
the maintenance of democratic institutions." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939).
190
